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FIFTEEN YEARS LATER – DID THE UNUM GROUP IMPROVE ITS ERISA 
CLAIMS HANDLING PRACTICES? 
 




In November 2004, Unum Life Insurance Company of America and 
related entities (“Unum”) agreed to a Regulatory Settlement Agreement 
(“RSA”) with state insurance regulators and the U.S. Department of Labor.1 
The RSA addressed “the Unum/Provident scandal.”2  The scandal resulted 
from Unum engaging “in a deliberate program of bad faith denial of 
meritorious benefit claims.”3  It has been over sixteen years since the RSA. 
This article evaluates Unum’s post-RSA conduct.  
Unum has argued, and some courts agreed, the practices the RSA 
addressed ended in 2004.4  Did they?  Or did Unum’s biased practices 
continue?  Spoiler alert: it is the latter.   
Section I discusses fiduciary obligations ERISA imposes on plan 
administrators like Unum, then discusses pre-RSA court decisions 
criticizing Unum’s claims administration practices, and ends with an 
examination of the RSA and 2005 RSA Amendment.  
Section II discusses decisions criticizing Unum’s claims 
administration practices after the RSA. It identifies Unum practices federal 
 
    * Philip Thomas is a litigation attorney with Morgan & Morgan in Jackson, 
Mississippi. https://www.forthepeople.com/attorneys/philip-thomas. 
    1. The RSA is discussed below. A significant amendment was added in 2005. 
Regulatory Settlement Agreement, 
https://www.maine.gov/pfr/insurance/publications_reports/exam_rpts/2004/unum_multis
tate/unum_regulatory_settlement_agreement.pdf [hereinafter RSA]. Amendment to 
Regulatory Settlement Agreement, 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5513/000119312505195355/dex102.htm. 
    2. John H. Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The Unum/Provident 
Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 NW. U. L. Rev. 
1315, 1316 (2007). 
    3. Id. at 1315. Describing Unum’s conduct as ‘bad faith’ is a misnomer, since 
ERISA bars extracontractual damages available in insurance bad faith cases.  
    4. See, e.g., Meyer v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 96 F. Supp. 3d 1234, 1246 
(D. Kan. 2015). (citing Swanson v. Unum Life Ins. Co., No. 13-CV-4107-JAR, 2015 WL 
339313, at *8 (D. Kan. Jan. 26, 2015)). In Swanson, the court stated: “Unum’s previous 
pattern of misconduct is ‘no longer present.’” Meyer, 96 F. Supp. 3d at 1246, n.15 (citing 
Swanson, 2015 WL 339313, at *8 and n. 41).  
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courts repeatedly criticize when called to their attention.  Many of the 
criticized practices were the same ones the RSA addressed.   
Section III discusses decisions finding Unum’s history of biased 
claims administration ended by 2004.  It concludes these decisions resulted 
from thinly cited claimant/plaintiff briefs leading to courts accepting 
Unum’s inaccurate summaries of recent decisions.   
Section IV evaluates Unum’s post-RSA conduct. It concludes that, 
if anything, Unum’s systemic pattern of biased claims administration 
accelerated after 2004.  The article concludes Unum is unlikely to change 




A. Fiduciary obligations of ERISA plan administrators5 
 
Effective January 1, 1975,6 The Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. ERISA 
covers employee benefit plans, including medical, disability, and death.7  
29 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. sets ERISA’s fiduciary responsibility.  29 U.S.C. 
§ 1104 states an ERISA fiduciary shall discharge its duties solely in the 
interest of the participants and beneficiaries for the exclusive purposes of 
providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries and defraying 
reasonable expenses of administration.8 
 
B. Standard of review for ERISA administrators’ disability decisions 
 
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989), the 
Supreme Court imposed a de novo standard of review on ERISA 
administrators’ benefits decisions unless the plan gives the administrator 
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or construe plan 
terms.9  In that case, a “deferential standard of review” applies.10  This 
translates to an ‘abuse of discretion’ standard.11  Most plans impose the 
lower abuse of discretion standard because of Firestone, and courts decide 
most cases under this deferential standard.  Courts sometimes refer to the 
 
    5. This is a brief overview of ERISA provisions pertinent to this article. It is 
not a comprehensive summary or analysis of ERISA. 
    6. 29 U.S.C. § 1114(a) (1989). 
    7. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2019). This article focuses on disability plans. 
    8. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2019).  
    9. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (U.S. 1989).   
  10. Id. at 111. 
  11. Id. at 115. 
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standard as the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard, but they are essentially 
identical.12 
An ERISA administrator has a conflict of interest when it 
determines benefits eligibility as administrator and pays benefits as the 
insurer.13  Therefore, insurers wanting to make coverage decisions as plan 
administrators have a conflict of interest.  Unlike attorneys, however, the 
conflict is not disqualifying for ERISA insurers.  Despite a purported 
fiduciary duty to beneficiaries, insurer-administrators can enrich 
themselves by denying and terminating legitimate claims.     
Under Glenn, the administrator’s conflict of interest is only one 
factor courts must consider.14  But in a direct reference to Unum, the Court 
stated: “[t]he conflict of interest… should prove more important (perhaps 
of great importance) where circumstances suggest a higher likelihood that 
it affected the benefits decision, including, but not limited to, cases where 
an insurance company administrator has a history of biased claims 
administration.”15  Unum operates under this conflict of interest because it 
serves in the dual role as plan administrator and insurer. 
 
C. Liability shields for ERISA administrators 
 
ERISA remedies are defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1109.  The statute 
permits beneficiaries to sue administrators who violate ERISA.16  In 1985, 
the Supreme Court held ERISA does not permit recovery of 
extracontractual (punitive) damages.17 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) grants courts 
discretionary authority to award reasonable attorney fees and costs in 







  12. James Goodley, The Effect of Metropolitan life v. Glenn on ERISA 
Benefit Denials: Time for the “Treating Physician Rule”, 26 J. Contemp. Health L. & 
Pol’y 403, 407 (2010) (citing Ladd v. ITT Corp., 148 F.3d 753, 754 (7th Cir. 1998)). See 
also Meditrust Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Sterling Chem., Inc., 168 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(agreeing the difference between abuse of discretion standard and arbitrary and 
capricious standard is not substantive in ERISA benefits review context) (citing Wildbur 
v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 1992)).   
  13. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 108 (2008). 
  14. Id. at 108 (citing Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115). 
  15. Id. at 117 (citing Langbein, supra note 3, at 1317-21).  
  16. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985). 
  17. Id. at 137.  
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D. History of Unum Life Insurance Company 
 
Unum originated in 1848 as Union Mutual, a Boston based life 
insurance company.18 In 1986 Union Mutual changed its name to Unum.19  
In 1999 Unum merged with Provident Life and Accident Insurance 
Company to form UnumProvident Corporation.20  In 2007 Unum Provident 
changed its name to Unum Group.21  At various times, Unum operated 
through various subsidiaries, including: Unum Life Insurance Company of 
America, First Unum Life Insurance Company of America, The Paul 
Revere Life Insurance Company, Provident Life and Accident Insurance 
Company, Provident Life and Casualty Insurance Company.22  Unum’s 
principal place of business is in Chattanooga, Tennessee.23  
 
E. Court decisions in Unum cases before the RSA 
 
In 2004 a Massachusetts District Court examined Unum’s history in 
Radford Trust v. First Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am.24  The court uncovered “a 
disturbing pattern of erroneous and arbitrary benefits denials, bad faith 
contract misinterpretations, and other unscrupulous tactics.”25  Radford 
Trust listed many decisions criticizing Unum.26  The court recognized some 
 
  18. History, UNUM.com, https://www.unum.com/about/corporate/history. 
  19. Id.  
  20. Id.  
  21. Id.  
  22. Id. See also RSA, supra note 2, at 1 (listing Unum subsidiaries bound by 
RSA). 
  23. RSA, supra note 2, at 1. 
  24. 321 F. Supp. 2d 226 (D. Mass. 2004). 
  25. Id. at 247 (citing Hedley-Whyte v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. Civ. A. 
94-11731-GAO, 1996 WL 208492, at *3 (D. Mass. Mar. 6, 1996); Keller v. Unum Life 
Ins. Co. of Am., No. 90 Civ. 5718(VLB), 1992 WL 346343, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 
1992) (describing Unum’s behavior as “culpably abusive”)). 
  26 See Radley Radford Trust v. First Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 321 F. Supp. 
2d, 226, 247 n.20 (D. Mass. 2004). 
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decisions were decided under de novo review.27  Other decisions were 
decided under the arbitrary and capricious or abuse of discretion standard.28 
 
  27. Id. (citing Lauder v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., Nos. 02-9152, 02-9232, 76 
Fed. Appx. 348, 350, 2003 WL 21910757, at *2 (2d Cir. Aug. 8, 2003) (unpublished 
opinion) ("There was ample demonstration of bad faith on First Unum's part, including ... 
the frivolous nature of virtually every position it has advocated in the litigation."); Curtin 
v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 298 F. Supp. 2d 149, 159 (D. Me. 2004) (“[T]his Court 
finds that Defendants exhibited a low level of care to avoid improper denial of claims at 
great human expense.”); Locher v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 96 Civ. 
3828(LTS)(HPB), 2002 WL 362769, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2002) (overturning 
Unum's denial of benefits, despite Unum's argument that the claimant was not disabled 
because she worked a full day the day she left her job); Barone v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of 
Am., 186 F. Supp. 2d 777, 787 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Wilkes v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
No. 01-C-182-C, 2002 WL 926279, at *10 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 29, 2002) (finding “that the 
defendant's position was not substantially justified or taken in good faith”); Hall v. Unum 
Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 97-CV-1828, 1999 WL 33485551, at *8 (D. Colo. Nov. 1, 
1999) vacated in part on other grounds, 300 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2002); Leva v. First 
Unum Ins. Co., No. 96 CIV 8590(DC), 1999 WL 294802, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 
1999) (noting that “Unum is ‘culpable’ in the sense that it did not consider [the 
plaintiff's] application with the care that she deserved,” and that the only medical review 
of the claim was done by a registered nurse, who happened to be the claims examiner's 
mother); Jones v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 95-5808, 1998 WL 778366, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 1998), vacated in part on other grounds, 223 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2000); 
Ragsdale v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 999 F. Supp. 1016, 1026 (N.D. Ohio 1998); 
Dishman v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 96-0015-JSL, 1997 WL 906146, at *11-13 
(C.D. Cal. May 9, 1997) (noting that the court would have reached the same decision 
under an arbitrary and capricious standard, and describing Unum Life's "unscrupulous 
conduct" in engaging in "bad faith denial of large claims as a strategy for settling them 
for substantially less than the amount owed"); Hamner v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
No. C 96-1973 TEH, 1997 WL 257515, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 1997); Mays v. Unum 
Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 95 C 1168, 1995 WL 631807, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 1995)). 
  28. See Radley Radford Trust, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 247 n.20 (citing Morgan v. 
Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 346 F.3d 1173, 1178 (8th Cir. 2003); Lain v. Unum Life Ins. 
Co. of Am., 279 F.3d 337, 346-47 (5th Cir. 2002) (basing the decision in part on Unum's 
misinterpretation of its own policy); Shutts v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., No. 1:01-cv-
1993, 2004 WL 615134, at *7-8 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2004); Crespo v. Unum Life Ins. 
Co. of Am., 294 F. Supp. 2d 980, 994, 996-97 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (reversing in part because 
Unum based its denial on failure to prove “disability” before or near the last day of 
work); Mennenoh v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 302 F. Supp. 2d 982, 989-90 (W.D. 
Wis. 2003); Cheng v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 291 F. Supp. 2d 717, 721 (N.D.  Ill. 
2003); Pelchat v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 3:02CV7282, 2003 WL 21479170, at 
*3 (N.D. Ohio June 25, 2003) ("Unum's decision was therefore not based on a good faith 
interpretation of its policy language or an honest mistake."); Dirnberger v. Unum Life 
Ins. Co. of Am., 246 F. Supp. 2d 927, 935 (W.D. Tenn. 2002); Henar v. First Unum Life 
Ins. Co., No. 02 Civ. 1570(LBS), 2002 WL 31098495, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2002); 
Holzschuh v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. Civ. A. 02-1035, 2002 WL 1609983, at *9 
(E.D. Pa. July 18, 2002); Winters v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 232 F. Supp. 2d 918, 
932-33 (W.D. Wis. 2002); Heffernan v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. C-1-97-545, 
2001 WL 1842465, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 21, 2001); Newman v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of 
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After 2004, other courts have recognized Unum’s history of biased 
and abusive claim reviews.29  Some courts reached a contrary conclusion, 
finding there was no evidence Unum’s abusive practices extended past 
2003.30  
 
F. The 2004 RSA and 2005 Amended RSA 
 
On September 2, 2003, three state insurance regulators31 launched 
an investigation of Unum’s claims handling practices.32  Regulators 
investigated whether Unum’s disability income claims handling practices: 
“reflected systemic ‘unfair claim settlement practices’ as defined in the 
NAIC Unfair Methods of Competition and Unfair and Deceptive Acts and 
Practices in the Business of Insurance Model Act (1972) or NAIC Claims 
Settlement Practices Model Act (1990).”33  Examiners reviewed seventy-
five randomly selected claims files from the Unum entities.34  The review 
identified these general areas of concern applicable to individual disability 
(“IDI”), and long term disability (“LTD”) claims: 
 
Am., No. 99 C 7420, 2000 WL 1593443, at *6-7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2000) (finding, in a 
case where Unum maintained a policy interpretation similar to First Unum's 
interpretation of the Policy in this case, that the “defendant contorted the meaning of its 
own policy in order to deny plaintiff's claim on a nonexistent technicality”); Hines v. 
Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 110 F. Supp. 2d 458, 460-61 (W.D. Va. 2000) (noting the 
“scathing failure by Unum Insurance to impartially administer the disability plan”); Lake 
v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 50 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1257 (M.D. Ala. 1999); Russell v. 
Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 40 F. Supp. 2d 747, 751 (D.S.C. 1999); Riley v. Unum Life 
Ins. Co. of Am., 28 F. Supp. 2d 639, 643-44 (D. Kan. 1998); see also Dandurand v. 
Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 284 F.3d 331, 336-38 (1st Cir. 2002) (overturning an 
arbitrary and capricious calculation of benefits); Wyatt v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
No. 97 C 8228, 1999 WL 116213, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 1999) (overturning a decision 
to offset a claimant's benefits because of an alleged eligibility for benefits from the 
Federal Insurance Company)). 
  29. See, e.g., McCauley v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 551 F.3d 126, 137 (2d 
Cir. 2008) (noting Unum’s well-documented history of abusive tactics).   
  30. See, e.g., Swanson v. Unum Life Ins. Co., No. 13-CV-4107-JAR, 2015 WL 
339313, at *8 (D. Kan. Jan. 26, 2015). 
  31. The three state regulators were the Maine Bureau of Insurance, the 
Massachusetts Division of Insurance and the Tennessee Department of Commerce and 
Insurance. Forty-nine other jurisdictions were listed as “participating jurisdictions.” See 
infra note 33.   
  32. J. David Leslie, Report of the Targeted Multistate Market Conduct 
Examination, 
https://www.maine.gov/pfr/insurance/publications_reports/exam_rpts/2004/unum_multis
tate/unum_multi-state_exam.pdf (Nov. 18, 2004).    
  33. Id. at 4. 
  34. Id. at 5. 
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• Excessive reliance upon in-house medical professionals, 
especially to discount or dispute opinions from claimants’ 
treating physicians;35 
• Unfair interpretation of attending physicians or independent 
medical exam (“IME”) reports, including focusing on 
apparent inconsistencies in medical records instead of trying 
to thoroughly understand claimant’s medical condition;36 
• Failure to evaluate claimants’ total medical condition by 
failing to properly evaluate the cumulative effects of 
claimants’ multiple conditions;37 and 
• Placing inappropriate burdens on claimants to justify 
benefits eligibility.38 
 
Regulators and Unum agreed to a Plan of Corrective Action 
resulting in the RSA.39  The RSA imposed a $15 million penalty.40  The 
Plan included claims reassessment, changes in claim organization and 
procedures, changes in corporate governance, and quarterly meetings 
between regulators and Unum.41  Effective October 3, 2005, Unum agreed 
to an amendment to the RSA that imposed additional requirements.42  
The RSA and RSA Amendment required Unum to: 
 
• Increase emphasis on employee accountability for 
compliance with law;43 
• Consider and give weight to all diagnoses and impairments 
and their combined effect on the whole person when 
evaluating medical data;44 
 
  35. Id. at 5-6. 
  36. Id. at 6. 
  37. Id.  
  38. Id. at 7.  
  39. Id. at 8. 
  40. Id.  
  41. Id. at 8-10. 
  42. Amendment to Regulatory Settlement Agreement, 
https://www.maine.gov/pfr/insurance/publications_reports/exam_rpts/2004/unum_multis
tate/unum_rsa_amendment.pdf [hereinafter RSA Amendment].  
  43. RSA, supra note 2, at 10. 
  44. RSA, supra note 2, Exhibit 4, 
https://www.maine.gov/pfr/insurance/publications_reports/exam_rpts/2004/unum_multis
tate/unum_exhibit-4.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2021).  
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• Give significant weight to the Social Security 
Administration’s (“SSA”) disability decision unless 
compelling evidence justifies disregarding it;45 
• Give significant weight to attending physicians’ opinions;46 
• Contact attending physicians to discuss disagreements;47 
• Fairly interpret and apply information from attending 
physicians;48 and 
• Explain medical reasons for disagreeing with attending 
physicians.49 
 
Exhibit 5 to the RSA was a Statement Regarding Medical 
Professional Conduct to be signed by Unum clinical, vocational, and 
medical professionals.50  The Statement’s requirements for Unum 
professionals included:  
 
• Discuss medical and vocational facts honestly; 
• Provide fair and reasonable evaluations considering 
objective and subjective evidence supporting impairment; 
• Consider all diagnoses and impairments; 
• Represent medical and vocational facts accurately; and 
• Provide reasonable, clear, and accurate explanations of 
opinions.  
 
G. The Amended RSA’s imposition of the ‘treating physician rule’ on 
Unum 
 
The requirement for Unum to give significant weight to attending 
physicians’ opinions warrants attention.  RSA Amendment paragraph five 
states: 
 
5. [RSA] Section B.3.c.(i) shall be amended by adding the 
following factor to others relating to increased focus on 
policies relating to medical evidence: 
 
 
  45. RSA, supra note 2, at 8. 
  46. RSA Amendment at p. 2. 
  47. RSA, supra note 2, at 8. 
  48. Id.  
  49. RSA Amendment, supra note 43, at 1-2. 
  50. RSA, supra note 2, Exhibit 5, 
https://www.maine.gov/pfr/insurance/publications_reports/exam_rpts/2004/unum_multis
tate/unum_exhibit-5.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2021).  
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‘Giving significant weight to an attending physician’s 
(“AP”) opinion, if the AP is properly licensed and the 
claimed medical condition falls within the AP’s customary 
area of practice, unless the AP’s opinion is not well 
supported by medically acceptable clinical or diagnostic 
standards and is inconsistent with other substantial evidence 
in the record. In order for an AP’s opinion to be rejected, the 
claim file must include specific reasons why the opinion is 
not well supported by medically acceptable clinical or 
diagnostic standards and is inconsistent with other 
substantial evidence in the record.’ 
 
Unlike other RSA provisions, this requirement had no expiration date and: 
“may only be amended by obtaining the consent of the Lead 
Regulators….two-thirds of the Participating Regulators and the DOL, to 
any such amended provision.”51 
In Black & Decker, the Supreme Court recognized: “[a]s compared 
to consultants retained by a plan, it may be true that treating physicians, as 
a rule, ‘have a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an 
individual.’”52  Yet the Court held: “courts have no warrant to require 
administrators automatically to accord special weight to the opinions of a 
claimant’s physician; nor may courts impose on plan administrators a 
discreet burden of explanation when they credit reliable evidence that 
conflicts with a treating physician’s evaluation.”53  In doing so, the Court 
rejected imposing the ‘treating physician rule” applicable in SSA disability 
claims.54  
The SSA’s treating physician rule requires that administrative law 
judges determining a claimant’s disability status: “give deference to the 
opinions of the claimant’s treating physician, because ‘he is employed to 
cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an 
individual.’”55 The treating physician rule does not require that 
administrative law judges always defer to treating physicians, but there 
must be substantial evidence not to.56  Regula explained: 
 
  51. RSA, supra note 2, at 16, § (C)(10)(ii). 
  52. Black & Decker v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 832 (2003) (citing Regula v. Delta 
Family-Care Disability Survivorship Plan, 266 F.3d 1130, 1139 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(overruled in part by Black & Decker). 
  53. Decker, 538 U.S. at 834.  
  54. The Social Security Administration codified the treating physician rule. 
Regula, 266 F.3d at 1141 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d) (2001)). 
  55. Regula, 266 F.3d at 1139 (citing Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 
169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999)).  
  56. Regula, 266 F.3d at 1140. 
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‘When a nontreating physician's opinion contradicts that of 
the treating physician-but is not based on independent 
clinical findings, or rests on clinical findings also considered 
by the treating physician-the opinion of the treating 
physician may be rejected only if the ALJ gives `specific, 
legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial 
evidence in the record.'’ Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600 (quoting 
Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
"[I]f the treating physician['s] opinions are uncontroverted, 
those reasons must be clear and convincing." Smolen, 80 
F.3d at 1285.  The opinions of a nonexamining (or 
reviewing) physician may serve as substantial evidence 
under the rule, when they are supported by other evidence in 
the record and consistent with the evidence in the record 
overall.  See Shalala, 53 F.3d at 1041.57 
 
Unum’s obligation under the RSA imposes the same requirement as 
the treating physician rule worded differently: 
 
• Judge must give deference to treating physician’s opinion 
unless specific reasons not to based on substantial record 
evidence [treating physician rule]. 
• Unum must give significant weight to treating physician’s 
opinion unless not well supported by medically acceptable 
clinical or diagnostic standards and is inconsistent with 
other substantial record evidence [RSA]. 
 
Unum pays lip service to the RSA.  In most opinions, courts do not 
acknowledge the RSA and appear unaware it exists.  Still, many opinions 
criticize Unum for disregarding treating physicians’ opinions, as discussed 
below in section II D.  
Unum employees acknowledge treating physicians’ opinions but 
disregard them when they can cite any reason to do so.  Unum often does 
not support its justification with clinical or diagnostic standards or 
substantial record evidence.  Many decisions cited below found Unum 






  57. Id. at 1140. 
2021] ERISA CLAIMS HANDLING PRACTICES 209 
III. RECURRENT PATTERNS IN POST-RSA UNUM DECISIONS 
 
A. Improper cherry-picking from medical records 
 
As a fiduciary, ERISA plan administrators must interpret the 
administrative record in the beneficiaries’ interests.58  The RSA and RSA 
Amendment imposed additional requirements on Unum to discuss medical 
facts accurately and honestly.59 ‘Cherry-picking’ occurs when 
administrators selectively emphasize evidence favoring denial or 
termination.  Since 2002, many decisions faulted Unum for improperly 
cherry-picking from the administrative record.60 
Doe v. Unum61 is illustrative.  Unum’s employee-physician (Dr. 
Tony Smith) wrote he could find no evidence supporting the claimant’s 
complaints of diarrhea and fatigue.62   The court listed a full page of 
evidence contradicting Smith’s statement.63  The court stated: “Unum’s 
 
  58. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a). The ‘administrative record’ is the administrator’s 
claims file.  
  59. RSA, supra note 2, Exhibit 5, 
https://www.maine.gov/pfr/insurance/publications_reports/exam_rpts/2004/unum_multis
tate/unum_exhibit-5.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2021).  
  60. See Hines v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211995, at *15 
(N.D. Ohio Dec. 17, 2018) (“Unum was still able to cherry-pick language and carry on 
with its preferred court of action”); Clark v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 175341, at *44-7 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 10, 2018) (criticizing Unum physician’s 
selective review of record); Bencivenga v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 39117, at *40 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2015) (“Unum cherry-picked notes favorable 
to its termination decision”); Doe v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 35 F. Supp. 3d 182 (D. 
Mass. 2014) (showing Unum’s pattern of cherry-picking evidence); Doe v. Unum Life 
Ins. Co. of Am., 2014 .S. Dist. LEXIS 162042, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2014) (ruling for 
claimant who criticized Unum’s selective reliance on evidence); Hannon v. Unum Life 
Ins. Co. of Am., 988 F. Supp. 2d 981, 991 (S.D. Ind. 2013) (criticizing Unum’s practice 
of cherry-picking and ignoring evidence); McCauley, 551 F.3d at 136-7) (Unum's 
selective review of records indicative of abuse of discretion under Glenn); Glockson v. 
First Unum Life Ins. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47613, at *20 (N.D.N.Y. July 6, 2006) 
(“Unum has simply cherry-picked medical evidence in the record”); Mikrut v. Unum 
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92265, at *25 n.7 (D. Conn. Dec. 20, 2006) 
(Unum’s approach is results-oriented, if not mere cherry-picking); Moon v. Unum 
Provident Corp., 405 F.3d 373, 381 (6th Cir. 2005) (selective review of record tainted 
Unum’s review); Utter v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 404 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1213 (C.D. 
Cal. 2005) (Unum doctor’s cherry-picking records inconsistent with its role as fiduciary); 
Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Edwards, 210 S.W.3d 84, 92 (Ark. 2005) (Unum was 
cherry-picking medical records); Holzschuh, 2002 WL 1609983, at 24 (Unum acted more 
like plaintiff’s adversary than impartial judge by selectively reading records). 
  61. Doe v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am.,35 F. Supp. 3d 182 (D. Mass. 2014). 
  62. Id. at 187. 
  63. See id. at 190-91 (“there is no doubt [claimant] documented a persistent 
history of debilitating fatigue”). 
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reviewers paid little or no attention to this well-documented history in their 
reports.  Smith stated that he could find no lab etiology or clinical evidence 
supporting the reported fatigue.”64  The court was apparently unaware of 
Unum’s obligations under the RSA because it noted Unum owed no 
deference to claimant’s treating physicians: 
 
But this case is not about giving insufficient weight to 
acknowledged conditions; it is about failing to acknowledge 
those conditions in the first place….Unum’s physicians 
chose to either cursorily reference that evidence or ignore it 
all together.  ‘Engag[ing] with only that evidence which 
supports [the administrator’s] conclusion’ is not meaningful 
review.”65 
 
Dr. Tony Smith is a repeat offender for cherry-picking in Unum 
cases.  Another case where Dr. Smith improperly cherry-picked was 
Bencivenga v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am.66  In Bencivenga, the court found 
Unum improperly: (1) “cherry-picked notes favorable to its termination 
decision;”67 (2) made credibility determinations supporting termination 
from reviewing the file;68 (3) labeled claimant’s disability as mental so it 
could apply a 24-month coverage limit to mental illness;69 and (4) ignored 
claimant’s treating physicians.70  
That Dr. Tony Smith was faulted more than once for improper 
cherry-picking years after the RSA is significant.  The RSA’s Statement 
Regarding Medical Professional Conduct Dr. Smith had to sign warnings 
against the one-sided analysis Smith has repeated.  This suggests Unum 
approves of Smith’s improper methods, particularly when viewed in 
connection with the many other decisions faulting other Unum employees 
for cherry-picking.  
  
B. Disregarding evidence favorable to claimants 
 
Disregarding evidence favorable to claimants is another label courts 
use to describe Unum’s selective review of the record.  Many courts have 
 
  64. Id. at 192. 
  65. Id. 
  66. 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39117. 
  67. Id. at 32. 
  68. Id. at **33-34. 
  69. Id. at *26. 
  70. Id. at *25. 
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criticized Unum for disregarding evidence favorable to claimants.71 
Hannon v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am.72  is illustrative.  Plaintiff was a 
registered nurse disabled with a disorder affecting her connective tissues.73 
After first granting plaintiff’s claim, Unum re-reviewed her file.74  Unum 
terminated benefits ten years after originally granting the claim.75  
Citing medical records that Unum failed to address, the court found 
Unum failed to adequately address the plaintiff’s entire medical file.76  
 
  71. See, e.g., Tam v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186477, 
at *28 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2020) (finding Unum’s in-house physicians mischaracterized 
and/or ignored evidence in the record);  Christoff v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 2019 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167889, at *28 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2019) (Unum arbitrarily 
disregarded and selectively presented evidence); Kamerer v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
334 F. Supp. 3d 411, 417, 426 (D. Mass. 2018) (Unum's reviewers offered no reasons to 
disagree with numerous other medical professionals); Hines, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
211995, at *15) (Unum omitted potentially relevant medical information); Clark., 2018 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175341, at *47 (“ Unum disregarded unfavorable evidence, a hallmark 
of selective review); Dimopoulou v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 162 F. Supp. 3d 250, 261 
(S.D. N.Y. 2016) (citing evidence Unum ignored); Backman v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of 
Am., 191 F. Supp. 3d 1053, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“Unum overlooked records that did 
not agree with its consultants’ conclusions”); Warner v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 178765, at *42 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 31, 2014) (Unum ignored substantial 
evidence); Doe, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 193 (Dr. Tony Smith and other Unum employees “did 
not fully and reasonably consider the evidence of Doe’s physical condition”); Doe, 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162042, at **8-9 (Unum ignored concerns expressed by claimant’s 
treating physicians); Petrusich v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 984 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1124 
(D. Or. 2013) (Unum ignored evidence supporting claimant’s claim); Freeland v. Unum 
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116931 (W.D. Wisc. Aug. 16, 2013); 
Hannon, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 988  ((Unum ignored most of claimant’s medical history); 
Schindler v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116837, at *44 (D. S.C. 
Aug. 19, 2013) (“Unum was willfully blind to the most relevant information”); Stephan 
v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 697 F.3d 917, 937-38 (2d Cir. 2012) (Unum’s 
disregarding evidence supports conclusion its conflict of interest affected its decision 
making); Houston v. Unum Life, Ins. Co. of Am., 246 F. App'x 293, 301 (6th Cir. 2007) 
("Unum did not give full consideration to [claimant's] objective vocational evidence”); 
Evans v. Unum Provident Corp., 434 F.3d 866, 879 (6th Cir. 2006); Utter, 404 F. Supp. 
2d at 1211 (ERISA fiduciary may not turn blind eye to uncontroverted medical opinions 
supporting disability); Lain , 279 F.3d at 346 (Unum did not objectively consider all 
facts); Dirnberger, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 932 (W.D. Tenn. 2002) (Unum overlooked 
important evidence). 
  72. 988 F. Supp. 2d 981. 
  73. Id. at 984. 
  74. Id. at 985. 
  75. Id.  
  76. Id. at 989-90. Plaintiff’s medical file exceeded 2,000 pages. 
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Unum “[selected] only a few snippets….and [took] them out of context.”77 
This conduct was an abuse of discretion.78  
 
C. Mischaracterization and failure to analyze claimant’s job duties 
 
Unum disability policies define ‘disability’ as when the claimant is 
unable to perform the material and substantial duties of their regular 
occupation.79  This requires Unum, as plan administrator, to: (1) perform 
an analysis to identify claimant’s job duties; and (2) analyze whether 
claimant can perform his/her job duties.80  Courts often criticize Unum for 
mischaracterizing claimants’ job duties and/or failing to analyze his/her job 
duties.81  A recurrent theme is Unum applied a general sedentary job 
standard rather than analyzing the material duties of plaintiff’s actual 
occupation.82   
 
  77. Id.  
  78. Id. The court also criticized Unum for rejecting plaintiff’s treating 
physicians’ opinions without explanation. See id.   
  79. See, e.g., Doe, 35 F. Supp. 3d 182) (quoting Unum plan’s disability 
definition); Raithaus v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 335 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1102 (D. 
Haw. 2004) (same).  
  80. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Liberty Mut. Grp., Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 977, 993 
(S.D. Ind. 2012) (finding characterization of job as sedentary not illuminating of material 
and substantial duties); Doe, 35 F. Supp. 3d 182, 193 (D. Mass. 2014) (criticizing 
Unum’s failure to analyze how claimant’s conditions affected ability to perform job 
duties). 
  81. See, e.g., Christoff, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167889, at *25 (Unum abused 
its discretion by arbitrarily changing level of physical demand without substantial 
evidence); Kamerer, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 419- Unum doctor concluded claimant was not 
occupationally disabled from sedentary work but did not analyze material duties of her 
occupation as defined by vocational review); Dimopoulou, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 260 
(Unum ignored evidence and failed to analyze plaintiff’s functional capacity); Hertan v. 
Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 111 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (Unum 
conflated sedentary nature of job with actual job duties); Warner, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
178765, at *31 (no evidence Unum compared description of physical demands of job 
with claimant's capabilities and limitations); Doe, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 193 (Unum seizes on 
sedentary nature of job rather than plaintiff's job duties); Doe, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
162042, at *17 (Unum failed to analyze plaintiff’s job duties); Petrusich, 984 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1123 (nothing in record indicates Unum analyzed whether plaintiff could perform job 
duties); Clarke v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 852 F. Supp. 2d 663, 680 (D. Md. 2012) (Unum’s 
FCE failed to analyze or explain how plaintiff could drive required 8 hours); Houston, 
246 F. App'x 293 at  300 (faulting Unum for miss-classifying claimant's job as 
sedentary); Hines, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 465-66 (Unum failed to analyze whether cervical 
condition prevented legal secretary from using right arm). 
  82. See, e.g., Doe, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 193. See also Zurndorfer v. Unum Life 
Ins. Co. of Am., 543 F. Supp. 2d 242, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating Unum’s 
characterization of plaintiff’s job “bespeaks advocacy”). 
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Kamerer v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am.83  is typical of many Unum 
cases: 
 
• Initially approved claim;84 
• Terminated benefits;85 
• Claimant’s treating physicians explained she could not 
work;86 
• Unum ordered an IME to analyze general sedentary job 
standard rather than claimant’s occupational demands;87 
• Following Unum’s instructions, IME doctor did not address 
claimant’s actual occupational demands;88 
• Unum incorrectly labeled claimant’s disability as mental;89 
• Unum employees “did not analyze the material duties of her 
occupation as defined by the vocational review”;90 
• “None of Unum’s reviewers offered any reasons to disagree 
with the numerous other medical professionals that had seen 
[claimant] over a period of many years and without any 
explanation ‘arbitrarily refused to credit’ their findings”91; 
• Unum disregarded treating physician opinions supported by 
objective evidence;92 
• Unum’s internal consultant stated “it was clinically 
reasonable” to conclude claimant’s disability was mental 
based.93 
 
Unum’s vocational reviewer concluded plaintiff’s occupation was 
‘systems project manager.’94  Unum’s in-house physician labeled plaintiff’s 
occupation as ‘sedentary’ and did not analyze the material duties defined 
by the vocational review.95  The IME doctor concluded plaintiff could 
 
  83. Kamerer v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 334 F. Supp. 3d 411 (D. Mass. 
2018). 
  84. Id. at 415. 
  85. Id. at 416. 
  86. Id.  
  87. Id. at 417. 
  88. Id. at 418. 
  89. Id. at 427. Unum policies limit payments for mental disability to two years.  
  90. Id. at 419. 
  91. Id. at 426 (citing Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 
823 (2003)). 
  92. Id. at 427. 
  93. Id. at 429.   
  94. Id. at 417. 
  95. Id. at 419.  
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satisfy the physical demands of her occupation but admitted he knew little 
about her job duties.96  The doctor had no recollection of seeing the 
plaintiff’s job description.97  
Several courts criticized Unum for not accurately defining a 
claimant’s job duties when trying to secure an opinion of non-disability.98  
Courts have also criticized Unum for disregarding claimants’ report that 
Unum’s independent physician did not perform a thorough exam.99 
In Doe v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am.,100 Unum terminated an 
engineer’s long-term disability benefits.  The policy defined ‘disability’ as 
when due to sickness or injury, claimant is unable to perform the material 
and substantial duties of your regular occupation.101  ‘Material and 
substantial duties’ means duties that are typically required for the 
performance of claimant’s regular occupation and cannot be reasonably 
omitted or modified.102  Unum’s vocational consultant identified seven 
material and substantial duties for plaintiff’s occupation.103  None of 
Unum’s consulting physicians considered plaintiff’s job duties.104  Instead, 
Unum exclusively focused on the physical demands of plaintiff’s job.105  
The court found plaintiff’s occupation “involved much more than 
physical duties.”106  Unum’s own vocational consultant concluded the job 
involved multiple intellectual, oral, written, social, and organizational 
duties.107  Unum’s failure to consider any material and substantial duties 
are required by the Plan’s language “established that its decision ‘was not 
reasoned and based on an individualized assessment of [Doe’s] 
abilities.’”108  
 
  96. Id. at 418, 426. 
  97. Id. at 418. 
  98. See e.g., (Unum employee changed physical demands for occupation to 
general sedentary level); Kamerer, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 417 (Unum asked IME doctor 
same questions it asked Dr. Lee); Doe, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162042, at *17 (Unum 
cannot rely on consulting doctor's opinion when he does not consider her job duties). 
  99. See e.g., Kamerer, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 411,424 (Unum ignored claimant’s 
complaint that IME lasted 5 minutes); Meyer v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 96 F. Supp. 
3d 1234, 1252 (D. Kan. 2015) ("Unum relied on an opinion by Lambrew, a tainted, 
highly paid Unum contractor who rendered his opinion in response to leading questions 
and discounted physical test results.") 
100. No. 13-6900 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2014). 
101. Id. at **6-7. 
102. Id. at *7. 
103. Id. at *8. 
104. Id.  
105. Id. at *9.  
106. Id.  
107. Id.  
108. Id. (citing Miller v. American Airlines, Inc., 632 F.3d 837, 845 (3d Cir. 
2011); Kuntz v. Aetna, Inc., No. 10-0877, 2013 WL 2147945, at *10 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 
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Several courts criticized Unum for not accurately defining a 
claimant’s job duties to outside physicians when trying to secure an opinion 
of non-disability.109   Courts also criticize Unum for disregarding claimants’ 
complaints that Unum’s independent physician did not perform a thorough 
exam.110 
 
D. Requesting independent physicians opine on mis-defined job 
description. 
 
Unum policies typically define the disability: 
 
You are disabled when Unum determines that: you are 
limited from performing the material and substantial duties 
of your regular occupation due to your sickness or injury; 
and you have a 20% or more loss in your indexed monthly 
earnings due to the same sickness or injury.111 
 
Under this definition, “the issue is whether [claimants’] condition has 
rendered [them] physically unable to perform the duties of [their] 
occupation.”112  
The RSA addressed Unum consulting independent physicians to 
opine on whether a claimant can work. RSA exhibit 6 is ‘Guidelines for 
Independent Medical Evaluations.’  It begins: 
 
If a determination is made that the medical information in 
the claim file lacks clarity or sufficiency in assessing the 
insured’s medical condition in order to validate the claim 
 
2013); Loomis v Life Ins. Co. of N. America, No. 09-3616, 2011 WL 2473727, at *6 
(E.D. Pa. June 21, 2011); Simon v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., No. 10-4286, 2011 WL 
2971203, *5 (D. N.J. July 20, 2011)). 
109. See, e.g., Christoff, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167889, at *10 (Unum 
employee changed physical demands for occupation to general sedentary level); 
Kamerer, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 417 (Unum asked IME doctor same questions it asked Dr. 
Lee); Doe, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162042 at *17 (Unum cannot rely on consulting 
doctor's opinion when he does not consider her job duties). 
110. See e.g., Kamerer v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 334 F. Supp. 3d 411, 424 
(D. Mass. 2018) (Unum ignored claimant’s complaint that IME lasted 5 minutes); Meyer 
v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 96 F. Supp. 3d 1234, 1252 (D. Kan. 2015) ("Unum relied 
on an opinion by Lambrew, a tainted, highly paid Unum contractor who rendered his 
opinion in response to leading questions and discounted physical test results.") 
 
111. See Kamerer, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 414 (quoting Unum policy’s disability 
definition).  
112. Id. at 421. 
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under the requirements of the applicable policy or if the 
Company has reason to question the opinions or information 
provided by a claimant’s AP [attending physician], the 
appropriate Company medical professional should contact 
the AP either by phone or by letter for clarification or 
additional information. 
 
If the attending physician and Unum professional cannot agree, then Unum 
should generally order an independent medical examination.113  But as 
shown above, Unum stacks the deck by not accurately defining claimant’s 
job duties to the IME physician and requests the physician opine on a lesser 
work standard.  An example is when Unum requests the physician evaluate 
whether claimant can perform any sedentary work instead of the material 
and substantial duties of her occupation.  
Recent decisions point to Unum skirting the court core issue and 
addressing whether claimants have noticed that Unum and its hired 
physicians do not actually analyze claimants’ material job duties. Instead, 
Unum analyzes whether claimants have the functional capacity to perform 
the physical demands of the job as defined by Unum.114  Unum uses 
Department of Labor definitions to define physical demands.115  Unum 
classifies claimants who work in offices as sedentary workers and analyze 
whether they “have functional capacity for a full-time occupation with 
sedentary physical demands as defined by the Department of Labor.”116   
In Kamerer, claimant was a highly compensated partner Unum 
classified as a systems project manager.117  Unum’s vocational review 
identified specific job requirements including travel.118  But when Unum 
analyzed whether claimant could perform her material job duties, it applied 
the same general sedentary job demands it would apply to a secretary or 
receptionist.119  
Unum’s in-house physician noted claimant’s sedentary occupation 
“but did not analyze the material duties of her occupation as defined by the 
vocational review.”120  Unum ordered an independent medical exam, but 
told the physician to address physical demands only rather than claimant’s 
 
113. RSA exhibit 6 defines certain criteria under which an independent medical 
examination is not required. See RSA, ex. 6, section A.2. 
114. Kamerer, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 417.  
115. Id.  
116. Id. at 417. 
117. Id. at 415-16. 
118. Id. at 416. 
119. Id.  
120. Id. at 419.  
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material job duties.121  The IME physician testified he did not see claimant’s 
job description and only knew “she worked as  consultant for a large 
consulting firm.”122  He “concluded that, from a purely physical standpoint, 
[claimant] could satisfy the physical demands of a System Project 
Manager.”123  
Another example of Unum’s failure to analyze claimant’s material 
job duties was in Doe v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am.124  Claimant worked as 
a validation process engineer.125  The plan “required Unum to base its 
disability determination on [claimant’s] ability to perform the material and 
substantial duties of her Validation Engineer position, not the presence of 
an impairment.”126  Unum’s vocational consultant identified seven material 
and substantial job duties of a validation process engineer.127  The first was 
“developing and executing validation protocols for processes and 
equipment to produce products meeting internal and external purity, 
quality, and safety standards.”128  But “none of Unum’s consulting doctors 
considered [claimant’s] job duties in concluding she was not mentally 
disabled.”129  The doctors could not consider claimant’s job duties because 
Unum did not give them the job description.130  In a familiar pattern, Unum 
instead gave reviewing physicians its description of the physical demands 
of the job.131   
Recognizing the impropriety of Unum’s focus on physical demands, 
the court stated: “[claimant’s] Validation Engineer position involved much 
more than physical demands.”132  “The position involved multiple 
intellectual, oral, written, social, and organizational duties.”133  The court 
concluded: “Unum’s failure to consider any of these ‘material and 
substantial’ duties, as required by the unambiguous Plan language, 
establishes that its decision ‘was not reasoned and based on an 
individualized assessment of [claimant’s] abilities.’”134 
 
121. Id. at 417. 
122. Id. at 418. 
123. Id. at 426. 
124. No. 13-6900 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2014). 
125. Id. at *1.  
126. Id. at *10. 
127. Id. at *8. 
128. Id.  
129. Id.  
130. Id. at *9.  
131. Id.  
132. Id.  
133. Id.  
134. Id.  
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Christoff v. Unum Life Ins. Co.135  is similar.  Unum asked its 
vocational reviewer to lower claimant’s occupational level to a general 
sedentary level.136  Presumably unaware of decisions showing this was a 
pattern, the court described the issue as a “red herring.”137  The court instead 
found Unum abused its discretion by employing other familiar improper 
tactics: (1) ignoring treating physicians’ opinions;138  (2) not applying 
Unum’s policy to defer to treating physicians;139 (3) not giving specialists’ 
opinions more weight than Unum’s generalists;140 (4) fabricating 
evidence;141 and (5) not following its policy regarding weighing SSA 
disability determinations.142  
 
E. Disregarding attending physicians’ opinions on disability 
 
In Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord,143 the Supreme Court 
recognized physicians repeatedly retained by administrators: “may have an 
‘incentive to make a finding of ‘not disabled’ in order to save their 
employers money and to preserve their own consulting arrangements.’”144     
Nevertheless, the Court held administrators need not defer to claimant’s 
treating physicians on the question of disability.145   Further, “the Act [does 
not] impose a heightened burden of explanation on administrators when 
they reject a treating physician’s opinion.”146   But administrators “may not 
arbitrarily refuse to credit a claimant’s reliable evidence, including the 
opinions of treating physicians.”147  And while Nord dictates administrators 
have no heightened burden of explanation for rejecting a treating 
physician’s opinion, failing to explain a legitimate basis for disagreeing 
with treating physicians constitutes an arbitrary refusal to credit claimant’s 
reliable evidence.148  
 
135. 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167889. 
136. Id. at *9.  
137. Id. at *21.  
138. Id. at **22-23. 
139. Id. at *23. 
140. Id. at *23. 
141. Id.  
142. Id. at ** 11-12, 29. 
143. Nord, 538 U.S. 822. 
144. Id. at 832 (citing Regula v. Delta Family-Care Survivorship Plan, 266 F.3d 
1130, 1143 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Black & Decker, 538 U.S. 
822). 
145. Id. at 831. 
146. Id.  
147. Id. at 834.  
148. Card v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 790 F. App’x 730, 743 (6th Cir. 2019); 
Majeski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 590 F.3d 478, 484 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Love v. 
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29 U.S.C. § 1133 requires that administrators: “provide adequate 
notice in writing to any participant or beneficiary whose claim benefits 
under the plan has been denied, setting forth the reasons for such denial, 
written in a manner calculated to be understood by the participant.”149  29 
C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g) imposes the additional requirement that 
administrators must give the specific reason or reasons for the adverse 
determination.  Examples of cases faulting the administrator’s failure to 
explain its basis for disagreeing with treating physicians include the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision in Kalish v. Liberty Mutual/Liberty Life Assurance Co.150 
and the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Love v. National City Cor. Welfare 
Benefits Plan.151 
At least one Circuit Court misinterpreted Nord. In 2014 in Menge v. 
AT&T, Inc. the Tenth Circuit butchered Nord with this misstatement of the 
law: “[i]ndeed, plan administrators may, without explanation, ‘credit 
reliable evidence that conflicts with a treating physician's evaluation.’"152 
Nord does not state administrators may disregard treating physician’s 
opinions without explanation. It states there is no “heightened burden of 
explanation.”153  Nord states administrators may not disregard a claimant’s 
evidence, including treating physicians’ opinions.154  Because of ERISA’s 
notice requirements discussed below, contrary to Menge, courts interpret 
Nord as requiring administrators to explain their basis for disagreeing with 
treating physicians.155  
For instance, in 2006 in Evans v. Unum Provident Corp. the Sixth 
Circuit stated: “a plan may not reject summarily the opinions of a treating 
physician, [and] must instead give reasons for adopting an alternative 
opinion.”156  The stated reasons must be objectively verifiable or 
 
Nat. City Corp., 574 F.3d 392, 397-98 (7th Cir. 2009)); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.  v. 
Conger, 474 F.3d 258, 265-68 (6th Cir. 2007); Kamerer, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 426. 
149. 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1974). Section 1133 also requires administrators to 
“afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for benefits has been 
denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate named fiduciary of the decision 
denying the claim.” 
150. Kalish v. Liberty Mut., 419 F.3d 501, 510 (6th Cir. 2005). 
151. Love, 574 F.3d at 397. 
152. Menge v. AT&T, Inc., 595 F. App’x 811, 815 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing 
Nord, 538 U.S. at 834). 
153. Nord, 538 U.S. at 831-34 
154. Id. at 834. 
155. See e.g., Kamerer, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 426 (citing Nord, 538 U.S. at 823).  
156. 434 F.3d at 877. 
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reasoned.157  Menge is an outlier. As of May 2020, the author found only 
one case citing Menge, and it was on a different point.158    
As explained in section I, F. above, the RSA imposes additional 
requirements on Unum not applicable to other ERISA administrators.   
Since the RSA, many courts have determined Unum unfairly disregarded 
attending physicians’ opinions.159   Apparently unaware of Unum’s 
obligations under the Amended RSA, courts made these decisions based on 
regular ERISA duties.  
Chistoff v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am.160 is an example of a decision 
criticizing Unum for ignoring treating physicians.  Recognizing an insurer 
may rely on reports from consulting non-examining physicians, the court 
explained the insurer must consider whether the conclusions are logical.161  
Plaintiff’s treating physicians had specialized training and experience 
 
157. Moon, 405 F.3d at 381. 
158. See Dahlin v. Wells Fargo Bank, no. 18-cv-00554-PAB-GFG, *12 (D. 
Colo. March 25, 2019). 
159. See e.g., Christoff, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167889, at *28 (Unum’s 
selective presentation of evidence and disregard for adamant opinions of claimant’s 
doctors was abuse of discretion); Dewsnup v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 2018 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 208688, at *27 (D. Utah Dec. 10, 2018) (treating physicians best able to 
judge credibility); Kamerer, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 417, 426 Unum's reviewers offered no 
reasons to disagree with numerous other medical professionals); Backman, 191 F. Supp. 
3d at 1066-67 (Unum favored reviews by employee doctors over every doctor who 
treated claimant); Bencivenga, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39117 * 33 (calling Unum's 
approach suspect); Doe, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162042, at *16-7 (Unum improperly 
disregarded opinions of treating doctors); Hannon, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 990 (Unum abused 
discretion by not articulating sufficient reasons for rejecting treating physicians); 
Petrusich, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 1119 (Unum improperly disregarded fact treating 
physicians supported disability); Clarke, 852 F. Supp. at 679 (Unum ignored treating 
physician’s opinion that claimant could not work); Eichelmann v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of 
Am., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92961, at *38-9 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 5, 2008) (improper for 
Unum to disregard specialist treating physicians in favor of employee non-specialist 
physicians); Houston, 246 F. App'x at 302 (Nord does not authorize administrator to 
disregard treating physicians' opinions); Evans, 434 F.3d at 879; Torgeson v. Unum Life 
Ins. Co. of Am., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1139 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (characterizing Unum’s 
disregard of treating physicians’ opinions as “cavalier”); Mikrut, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
92265, at  *26-7 (Unum disregarded restrictions from treating physicians); Utter, 404 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1211 (ERISA fiduciary may not turn blind eye to uncontroverted medical 
opinions supporting disability); Curtin, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 156 (Unum had no basis to 
disbelieve information from treating physician); Crespo, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 994-95 
(Unum's reliance on one-sided interpretation of an ambiguous note as basis to discount 
findings of treating physician was arbitrary and capricious); Morgan, 346 F.3d at 1178 
(Unum disregarded opinions of two treating physicians); Dirnberger, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 
932 (Unum failed to give sufficient weight to treating physicians).  
160. No. 17-3512 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2019). 
161. Id. at *22 (citing Willcox v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 552 
F.3d 693, 700-01 (8th Cir. 2009)). 
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treating the disabling condition.162  Further, “Unum’s manual calls for 
deference to treating physicians’ opinions and recognizes that the opinions 
of more experienced specialists should be weighed more heavily against 
those of less qualified doctors where applicable.”163  Unum’s reviewers 
misstated the record and fabricated conflict and inconsistency in the records 
where none existed.164  The court concluded Unum abused its discretion by 
terminating benefits because Unum’s evidence was overwhelmed by 
contrary evidence.165 
 
F. Failing to adequately communicate with attending physicians 
 
The RSA requires Unum to communicate with attending physicians 
who support the claimant’s disability. Unum included the requirement in its 
Benefits Center Claims Manual.  In 2013 Unum Lead Appeal Specialist 
Jennifer Wellman explained the policy in an affidavit filed in Vander-
Leeuw v. First Unum Life Ins. Co.166 Wellman explained:  
 
Pursuant to the Manual, where a medical resource such as 
an onsite physician or clinical consultant reaches a 
conclusion different than that of the claimant’s medical 
provider, the medical resource is to document the claim 
file with the basis for the differing medical conclusions, 
and make a peer-to-peer contact with the claimant’s 
medical provider.  The purpose of the peer-to-peer contact 
is to engage the claimant’s medical provider in a 
conversation about the basis for the difference in medical 
opinions in order to obtain a coherent view of the 




162. Id. at *23. 
163. Id.  
164. Id.  
165. Id. at **23-24. 
166. No. 11-CV-05685, Dkt. 31-5 (D. N.J. April 12, 2013). 
167. Id. at ¶25 (Wellman affidavit). 
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Several courts criticized Unum’s communications with treating 
physicians.168  For instance, in McCauley v. First Unum Life Ins. Co.169 the 
court found Unum seized on inconsistencies while avoiding following up 
with simple inquires to the treating physician.170  The court described 
Unum’s conductive as deceptive.171  It found Unum abused its discretion, 
reversing the district court’s summary judgment for Unum.172 
 
G. Disregarding Social Security Administration’s disability 
determination 
 
Disabled claimants are eligible for social security disability 
benefits.  Unum’s policies allow it to reduce benefits by the amount 
received from Social Security.  Unum and the SSA can reach different 
conclusions. An “administrator’s decision cannot be considered arbitrary 
and capricious solely because [SSA] rendered a different decision.”173  
However, “if the plan administrator (1) encourages the applicant to apply 
for Social Security disability payments; (2) financially benefits from the 
applicant's receipt of Social Security; and then (3) fails to explain why it is 
taking a position different from the SSA on the question of disability, the 
reviewing court should weigh this in favor of a finding that the decision 
was arbitrary or capricious.”174 
The RSA required Unum to “give significant weight to the [Social 
Security Administration's] determination that the claimant is disabled 
unless there is compelling evidence" that the award of SSDI was based on 
an error of law or abuse of discretion, inconsistent with applicable medical 
evidence; or inconsistent with the definition of disability contained in the 
applicable insurance policy.175  And suppose Unum disagrees with SSA’s 
finding.  In that case, it must “articulate the reason and analysis” and 
“support that reason and analysis with reference to facts and information in 
 
168. See e.g., Hart v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 253 F. Supp. 3d 1053, 1071-
72 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (Unum’s evidence of alleged phone call between doctors lacks 
credibility); McCauley, 551 F.3d at 136 (Unum avoided following up with treating 
physician); Crespo, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 994 (Unum’s efforts to contact treating physician 
inadequate). 
169. 551 F.3d 126. 
170. Id. at 135-36. 
171. Id. at 137. 
172. Id. at 138. 
173. Bennett v. Kemper Nat. Serv. Inc., 514 F.3d 547, 554 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(citation omitted). 
174. Id.; See also Mikrut, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92265, at *35 (finding Unum 
abused its discretion where it demanded a refund based on SSA’s award while failing to 
consider SSA’s disability determination). 
175. RSA, supra note 2, at 8.  
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the claim file documentation.”176 Numerous courts found Unum improperly 
disregarded SSA’s disability determination.177 
Backman v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am.178 is an example. Plaintiff 
was an account manager who stopped working due to back pain.179  Unum 
initially agreed plaintiff was disabled and paid benefits.180  With Unum’s 
assistance, SSA approved plaintiff’s claim.181  After SSA’s determination, 
Unum wrote plaintiff it would “apply significant weight to [SSA’s] award 
of disability benefits.”182  Unum stated: “significant weight means that 
[SSA’s] judgment that you were disabled at the time of the award will 
weigh heavily in your favor as we make ongoing disability determinations 
under your Long Term Disability policy.”183  
A year after SSA’s approval, Unum terminated the plaintiff’s 
benefits stating she was no longer disabled from performing the material 
and substantial duties of her occupation.184  Unum claimed its decision 
differed from SSA’s because Unum had additional information.185  The 
court disagreed because Unum had not obtained SSA’s file when it 
terminated benefits, meaning Unum was unaware SSA did not possess 
Unum’s information.186  The administrative record contradicted Unum’s 
arguments to distinguish SSA’s disability determination.187  The court cited 
 
176. Chronister v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 563 F.3d 773, 776 (8th Cir. 
2009) (quoting Unum’s claims manual). 
177. See, e.g., Tam, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186477, at *33 (finding SSA’s 
disability determination suggests claimant suffers from some limitation to her work 
ability); Christoff, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167889, at *34-35 (citing disregarding SSI 
findings as one of reasons supporting award of attorney fees); Kamerer, 334 F. Supp. 3d 
at 429 (Unum must prove more than it was reasonable to conclude mental illness 
contributed to disability); Backman, 191 F. Supp. 3d at 1078 (Unum disregarded SSA’s 
decision after promising to give it substantial weight); Chronister, 563 F.3d at 776 
(Unum’s failure to follow internal procedures regarding SSA’s determination required by 
RSA was egregious); Zurndorfer, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 262 (observing Unum assisting 
plaintiff in obtaining SSA disability meant Unum believed plaintiff disabled or Unum 
sought to defraud SSA); Mikrut, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92265, at *27-8 (Unum 
disregarding SSA’s decision is probative evidence Unum’s conflict influenced decision); 
Curtin, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 158 (SSA decision is relevant). See also Hines, 110 F. Supp. 
2d at 468 (finding in pre-RSA decision SSA’s decision is substantial evidence claimant 
disabled). 
178. 191 F. Supp. 3d 1053 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
179. Id. at 1056. 
180. Id. at 1057. 
181. Id.  
182. Id.  
183. Id.  
184. Id.  
185. Id. at 1070. 
186. Id.  
187. Id. at 1071. 
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Unum’s disregard of SSA’s determination as one of several factors 
supporting reversal of Unum’s termination.188 
A variation of Unum disregarding SSA’s disability determination is 
blaming the claimant’s disability on mental illness and invoking the 
policy’s two-year limit on disability due to mental illness.  This allows 
Unum to disregard SSA’s disability determination.  The court rejected this 
tactic in Kamerer v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am.189, finding Unum failed to 
meet its burden to show claimant’s mental conditions was a but-for cause 
of her inability to work.190  
 
H. Fabrication of evidence or misstating the administrative record 
 
Cherry-picking and disregarding evidence are one thing. 
Fabricating evidence reaches a higher level of misconduct.  Several courts 
found Unum employees fabricated evidence to support denial or 
termination of benefits.191   Typically the people fabricating evidence were 
Unum’s in-house medical employees. 
For instance, in Petrusich v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am.192, the court 
criticized Unum’s reviewing physician Dr. Kevin Hayes for making 
multiple misstatements used to justify termination and denial of claimant’s 
appeal.193  The court determined: “these inaccurate statements support the 
conclusion that Unum conducted a superficial and cursory review rather 











188. See id.  
189. 334 F. Supp. 411. 
190. Id. at 428. 
191. See, e.g., Tam, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186477, at *28 (finding Unum’s 
physicians mischaracterized and/or ignored record evidence); Petrusich, 984 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1120-21 (Unum physicians made misstatements in the record); Stephan, 697 F.3d at 
937 (Unum mischaracterized record); McCauley, 551 F.3d at 138 (Unum deceptively 
mischaracterized its rationale for denying benefits). 
192. 984 F. Supp. 2d 1112. 
193. Id. at 1120-21. 
194. Id. at 1121. 
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IV. EVALUATING UNUM’S POST-RSA CONDUCT 
 
A. Unum’s characterization of its post-RSA conduct 
 
Unum can cite a list of winning decisions in the last decade.195  
These decisions do not disprove Unum’s pattern of biased claims 
administration.  
 
195. See, e.g., Dorris v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 949 F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 
2020); Feeney v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 18-1302, 2020 WL 1452099 (C.D. Ill. 
Mar. 25, 2020); Hinchey v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., No. 17-CV-08034 (NSR), 2020 
WL 1331898 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2020); Luzzi v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. SACV 
18-1506 JVS (JDEX), 2020 WL 945406 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2020); Gary v. Unum Life Ins. 
Co. of Am., 388 F. Supp. 3d 1254 (D. Or. 2019); Irving v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
No. PJM 17-3206, 2019 WL 1331237 (D. Md. Mar. 25, 2019); Calcagno v. Unum Life 
Ins. Co. of Am., No. 3:17-CV-01890-YY, 2019 WL 2488716 (D. Or. Feb. 19, 2019), 
report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 2746729 (D. Or. July 1, 2019); 
Wittmann v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 793 F. App'x 281 (5th Cir. 2019); Mickel v. 
Unum Grp., 771 F. App'x 430 (9th Cir. 2019); O'Neill v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 
18-1382, 2018 WL 7959523 (6th Cir. Nov. 19, 2018); Jones v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 730 
F. App'x 170 (4th Cir. 2018); Dardick v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 739 F. App'x 481 
(10th Cir. 2018); Gilewski v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 683 F. App'x 399 (6th 
Cir. 2017); Stoddard v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 706 F. App'x 138 (4th Cir. 2017); Crox 
v. Unum Grp., Corp., 655 F. App'x 490 (6th Cir. 2016); Russell v. Catholic Healthcare 
Partners Emp. Long Term Disability Plan, 614 F. App'x 271 (6th Cir. 2015); St. Onge v. 
Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 559 F. App'x 28 (2d Cir. 2014); Truitt v. Unum Life Ins. Co. 
of Am., 729 F.3d 497 (5th Cir. 2013); Floerke v. SSM Health Care Plan, No. 17-CV-
567-WMC, 2018 WL 5045770 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 17, 2018); Cox v. Allin Corp. Plan, No. 
C 16-4675 SBA, 2018 WL 9543021 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2018); Koyuncu v. First Unum 
Life Ins. Co., No. 1:16-CV-04380-ELR, 2018 WL 9415108 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 28, 2018); 
Arabaitzis v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 16-1273 TNM/DAR, 2018 WL 4610893 
(D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:16-CV-01273 
(TNM), 2018 WL 6530581 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2018), reconsideration denied, 351 F. 
Supp. 3d 11 (D.D.C. 2018); Reidy v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. PX-16-2926, 2018 
WL 3756740 (D. Md. Aug. 7, 2018); Western v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. CV 16-
9527-JFW (ASX), 2018 WL 6071090 (C.D. Cal. July 3, 2018), aff'd, No. 18-56039, 
2020 WL 1277619 (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 2020); Dahlka v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 
17-CV-245-BBC, 2018 WL 2944518 (W.D. Wis. June 12, 2018); Price v. Unum Life 
Ins. Co. of Am., No. GJH-16-2037, 2018 WL 1352965 (D. Md. Mar. 14, 2018), aff'd, 
746 F. App'x 231 (4th Cir. 2018); Demko v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. CV 17-
2929-R, 2018 WL 5094893 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2018), aff'd, 780 F. App'x 537 (9th Cir. 
2019); Gilrane v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 1:16-CV-403, 2017 WL 4018853 
(E.D. Tenn. Sept. 12, 2017); Price v. Tyson Long-Term Disability Plan, No. 5:16-CV-
05075, 2017 WL 3567531 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 17, 2017); Stone v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of 
Am., No. 15-CV-0630-CVE-PJC, 2017 WL 57831 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 5, 2017); Bellard v. 
Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 15-0428, 2016 WL 7108577 (W.D. La. Dec. 5, 2016); 
Correia v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 14 CIV. 7690 (KPF), 2016 WL 5462827 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2016); Arrington v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 1:14-CV-549, 
2016 WL 7115970 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 
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2016 WL 7104040 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2016); Allen v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 
3:15-CV-219-JAG, 2016 WL 4571451 (E.D. Va. Sept. 1, 2016); Hans v. Unum Life Ins. 
Co., No. CV 14-02760-AB (MRWX) 2015 WL 5838462 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2015); Uqdah 
v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 14-6367 (SDW)(SCM), 2015 WL 5572678 (D.N.J. 
Sept. 21, 2015); Usztics v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 14-CV-11940, 2015 WL 
5013854 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 24, 2015); Bilyeu v. Morgan Stanley Long-Term Disability 
Plan, No. CV-08-02071-PHX-SRB, 2015 WL 4134447 (D. Ariz. June 2, 2015), aff'd, 
711 F. App'x 380 (9th Cir. 2017); Hinshaw v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. CV 14-
06157 DDP (PLAX), 2015 WL 2127085 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2015), aff'd, 677 F. App'x 
433 (9th Cir. 2017); Avena v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 13-5947, 2015 WL 
1726173 (E.D. La. Apr. 15, 2015); Bennett v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 3:13-CV-
426, 2015 WL 1476669 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2015); Swanson, 2015 WL 339313; 
Schussheim v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 80 F. Supp. 3d 360 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); Decorpo 
v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 13-CV-484-LM, 2014 WL 4794345 (D.N.H. Sept. 25, 
2014); Nelson v. Unum Grp. Corp., No. 1:13-CV-58, 2014 WL 3908183 (E.D. Tenn. 
Aug. 11, 2014); McGill v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 2:13-CV-00484, 2014 WL 
2169329 (S.D. Ohio May 23, 2014); Ellis v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 2:13-CV-
00080-JAW, 2014 WL 235212 (D. Me. Jan. 22, 2014); Pini v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 
981 F. Supp. 2d 386 (W.D. Pa. 2013); Hilton v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 967 F. Supp. 
2d 1114 (E.D. Va. 2013); McKeown v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 12-2041, 2013 
WL 4501183 (E.D. La. Aug. 21, 2013); Gonzales v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 09-
CV-0468-AJB, 2013 WL 12057481 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2013), aff'd, 622 F. App'x 704 
(9th Cir. 2015); Vander-Leeuw v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., No. 11-5685, 2013 WL 
3479433 (D.N.J. July 9, 2013); Earhart v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 11-14891, 
2013 WL 12180911 (E.D. Mich. July 3, 2013); Rice-Peterson v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of 
Am., No. 11-14565, 2013 WL 1250457 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 2013); Neilson v. Unum 
Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. CCB-11-3317, 2013 WL 1010361 (D. Md. Mar. 13, 2013); 
Hegger v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. C 11-04229 WHA, 2013 WL 785523 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 1, 2013); Mercado v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., No. 11 CIV. 4272 (RMB) ( 
RLE) 2013 WL 633100 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2013); Rozek v. New York Blood Ctr., 925 
F. Supp. 2d 315 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Franks v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 1:12-CV-
166, 2013 WL 449566 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 6, 2013); King v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
913 F. Supp. 2d 290 (W.D. La. 2012); Johnson v. Unum Grp., No. CIV-11-306-FHS, 
2012 WL 6569281 (E.D. Okla. Dec. 17, 2012);  James v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
No. 10 CIV. 9120(GBD), 2012 WL 4471541 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2012), aff'd, 531 F. 
App'x 126 (2d Cir. 2013); Murphy v. Unum Grp., No. CV-11-104-M-DWM, 2012 WL 
2359491 (D. Mont. June 20, 2012); St. Clare v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 1:11-
0067-JMS-MJD, 2012 WL 1666619 (S.D. Ind. May 11, 2012); Preizler v. First Unum 
Life Ins. Co., No. 10 CV 8511(VB,), 2012 WL 1871640 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2012); 
Trimble v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 846 F. Supp. 2d 999 (W.D. Ark. 2012); 
McClellan v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 3:11-CV-03022, 2012 WL 204157 (W.D. 
Ark. Jan. 24, 2012); Kaye v. Unum Grp./Provident Life & Acc., No. 09-14873, 2012 WL 
124845 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 17, 2012); Yu-Wen Lu v. Unum Grp., No. 09-CV-03080 RMW, 
2012 WL 44636 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2012); Fornash v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 
2:10-205-DCR, 2011 WL 4715163 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 5, 2011); Eppley v. Provident Life & 
Acc. Ins. Co., 789 F. Supp. 2d 546 (E.D. Pa. 2011); Kagan v. Unum Provident, 775 F. 
Supp. 2d 659 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Douglas v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 429 F. App'x 24 (2d 
Cir. 2011); Lopes v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., No. 09-CV-2642 (RRM) (SMG), 2011 
WL 1239899 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2011); Schnare v. Unum Life Ins. Co., No. 07-0910-
CV-W-FJG, 2010 WL 11619469 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 29, 2010); Daniel v. Unum Provident 
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Since 2004 Unum has argued that its era of abusive practices ended 
with the RSA. For instance, in Murphy v. First Unum Life Ins. Co.,196 Unum 
argued its restructuring of claims practices connected with the RSA 
obviated the need for discovery related to Unum’s conflict of interest.197  
The court rejected the argument, finding “the Court cannot take for granted 
First Unum’s claim to have mended its ways.”198  
Often, however, courts agree with Unum’s argument.199  These 
decisions are surprising because of the many cases where Unum repeated 
the same unscrupulous practices the RSA addressed.  To better understand 
 
Corp., No. CV-04-1073 (SJF) 2010 WL 8292157 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2010); Richards v. 
Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 1:09-CV-953, 2010 WL 4117364 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 
2010); Owens v. Rollins, Inc., No. 1:08-CV-287, 2010 WL 3843765 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 
27, 2010); Hagopian v. Johnson Fin. Grp., Inc. Long-Term Disability Plan, an ERISA 
Plan, No. 09-C-926, 2010 WL 3808666 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 23, 2010); Corby v. Unum Life 
Ins. Co. of Am., No. C 09-5890 WHA, 2010 WL 3768040 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2010); 
Byrd v. Unum Life Ins., No. H-09-2822, 2010 WL 3119919 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2010), 
aff'd sub nom. Byrd v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 421 F. App'x 397 (5th Cir. 2011); 
Bush v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. H-09-CV-1589, 2010 WL 3064076 (S.D. Tex. 
Aug. 3, 2010); Van Wright v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 740 F. Supp. 2d 397 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010); Burton v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. A-09-CA-532-SS, 2010 WL 2430767 
(W.D. Tex. June 14, 2010); Blackwell v. Unum Ins. Co. of Am., No. 04-CV-060-GKF-
PJC, 2010 WL 1257587 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 24, 2010); Richardson v. Triad Hosps., Inc. 
Grp. Long Term Disability Plan, No. 4:09-104-TLW, 2010 WL 503103 (D.S.C. Feb. 8, 
2010); Uquillas v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. CV 07-00542 MMM (AJWx), 2010 
WL 330255 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2010); Rosby v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 664 F. 
Supp. 2d 962 (E.D. Ark. 2009), aff'd sub nom. Rosby v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 391 F. 
App'x 579 (8th Cir. 2010). 
196. 15-cv-820 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2016). 
197. Murphy, No. 15-cv-820, *10 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2016). See also Wittman v. 
Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 19-30254, *10 (5th Cir. Dec. 6, 2019) (acknowledging 
court previously recognized Unum adopted new claims-handling practices that helped 
cure its history of biased administration) (citing Truitt, 729 F.3d at 514). 
198. Murphy, No. 15-cv-820, *10 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2016). 
199. See, e.g., Williamson v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. CIV-19-481-R, 
2019 WL 6683116, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 6, 2019) (plaintiff failed to establish how 
Unum’s claim practices from over a decade ago had anything to do with current claim); 
Brugler v. Unum Grp., No. 4:15-CV-01031, 2019 WL 4452226, at, *42-3 (M.D. Penn. 
Sept. 17, 2019) (Unum presented evidence in other litigation they changed internal 
procedures in positive way); Kamerer v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 251 F. Supp. 3d 
349, 352 (D. Mass. 2017) (court will not assume Unum biased because of claims practice 
more than a decade ago); Swanson, 2015 WL 339313, at, *9 (Unum’s abusive practices 
primarily relates to practices used in decade ending in 2003); Mercado, 2013 WL 
633100, at *43 (referencing Unum’s evidence that it changed its internal procedures); 
Taylor v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 3:11-cv-2602-N, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
74357, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2013) (concern about Unum’s history tempered by 
new claims-handling practices) (citing Burton, 2010 WL 2430767, at *10); Uquillas, 
2010 WL 330255 , at *17 (plaintiff made no effort to show how Unum’s “parsimonious 
claims-granting history” similar to conduct in instance case). 
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these decisions, the author reviewed plaintiffs’ briefs filed in support or 
opposition of summary judgment.  A recurrent pattern was plaintiffs thinly 
supported their arguments on Unum’s biased history and did not link the 
practices to conduct in plaintiffs’ claims. 
For instance, in Williamson v. Unum200, the only Unum case 
plaintiff cited was Fought v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997, 1002 
(10th Cir. 2004).201  In Swanson v. Unum, the only Unum case plaintiff cited 
was Stephan v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, 697 F.3d 917, 933-34 (9th 
Cir. 2012).202  Cases the court cited in Swanson included Jones v. Unum 
Provident Corp.203  In Jones, the only Unum cases plaintiff cited were 
Radford (2008) and Torres v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, 405 F.3d 670 
(8th Cir. 2005).  In Brugler v. Unum, the court stated plaintiff’s “historical 
research appears to be out of date and out of step with Defendants’ current 
practices.”204  
In Kamerer v. Unum, Plaintiff focused on the RSA and cited only a 
few post-RSA cases focusing on pre-RSA conduct.205  There is also an 
important historical footnote to the Kamerer decision Unum cites that 
courts omit.  Unum ultimately lost Kamerer on the merits in a blistering 
opinion that echoed Unum’s pre-2004 claims practices.206   The court 
found: “none of Unum’s reviewers offered any reasons to disagree with the 
numerous [attending physicians] and without any explanation ‘arbitrarily 
refuse[d] to credit’ their findings.”207  
In Mercado v. First Unum, Plaintiff cited McCauley (2008), which 
cited Radford (2004) and the 2007 law review article.208  In Taylor v. Unum, 
plaintiff’s brief cited no cases after the 2007 law review article.209 
In Burton v. Unum, the briefs were sealed, but the court noted 
plaintiff conceded Unum changed its conduct after Glenn.210  In Uquillas v. 
Unum, the only Unum cases plaintiff cited were Radford (2004) and 
 
200. No. CIV-19-481-R (W.D. Okla. Dec. 6, 2019) 
201. Plaintiff’s brief in Williamson is linked here. 
202. In Stephan the court reversed the district court for failing to consider 
Unum’s biased history, but cited pre-2003 authority. 697 F.3d at 933-34. 
203. 596 F.3d 433 (8th Cir. 2010). 
204. Brugler v. Unum, No. 4:15-CV-01031, *42 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2019).  
205. Plaintiff’s Motion for Discovery, Kamerer v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
334 F. Supp. 3d 411 (D. Mass. 2018). 
206. See Kamerer, 334 F. Supp. 3d 411. 
207. Id. at 426 (citing Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 
823 (2003)).  
208. Plaintiff’s memorandum in Mercado is linked here.  
209. Plaintiff’s brief in Taylor is linked here.  
210. Burton v. Unum Life Insurance Company of Am., No. A-09-CA-532-SS, 
at *18 (W.D. Tex. June 14, 2010). 
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McCauley (2008).211  The court also noted plaintiff made did not show 
similarities between Unum’s historical practices and its conduct in her 
claim.212  In Meyer v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am.,213 plaintiff’s brief focused 
on the Unum reviewing physician rather than a survey of Unum’s historical 
conduct.214 
 
B. The myth of the walled off Unum claims department 
 
In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, the Supreme Court stated an 
administrator’s conflict “would prove less important (perhaps to the 
vanishing point) where the administrator has taken active steps to reduce 
potential bias and to promote accuracy, for example, by walling off claims 
administrators from those interested in firm finances, or by imposing 
management checks that penalize inaccurate decisionmaking irrespective 
of whom the inaccuracy benefits.”215  As previously noted, some courts 
have found Unum did so based on affidavits Unum submitted on the 
conflicts issue. Other courts were unconvinced.216  However, comparing 
Unum affidavit to testimony of a company executive reveals Unum’s 
ongoing link between claims and finances. 
In 2013 Unum submitted the affidavit of Jennifer Wellman in 
Vander-Leeuw v. First Unum Life Ins. Co.217  Wellman was a Unum Lead 
Appeal Specialist.218  Wellman’s affidavit included: 
 
• Claims department has no role or responsibility in the 
management, reporting, or other functions regarding 
Unum’s finances;219 
• The claims department and appeal unit do not have to seek 
approval from financial underwriters;220 
 
211. Plaintiff’s trial brief in Uquillas is linked here.  
212. Uquillas v. Unum Life Insurance Company, No. CV 07-00542 MMM 
(AJWx), at *41 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2010). 
213. 96 F. Supp. 3d 1234 (D. Kan. 2015). 
214. Plaintiff’s brief in Meyer is linked here.  
215. Metro. Life. Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 117 (2008). 
216. See, e.g., Correia, 2016 WL 5462827, at *68 (stating evidence established 
Unum failed to wall off claims personnel from firm finances); Schindler, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 116837, at *63 (finding no evidence Unum walled off claims administrators from 
persons interested in firm finances and management checks were ineffective). 
217. Affidavit of Jennifer Wellman, 2:11-cv-05685-JLL-JAD, Dkt. 31-5 (April 
12, 2013). 
218. Id. ¶ 1.  
219. Id. ¶ 14. 
220. Id. ¶ 16. 
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• Employees not evaluated based on amount or number of 
claims paid or denied;221 
• Financial underwriters do not advise or influence the claims 
department or appeal unit on whether to pay claims;222 and 
• Financial executives not involved in claim decisions.223 
 
The 2018 deposition of former Unum Assistant Vice President of Claims 
Paul Peter reveals Wellman’s testimony was misleading. 
Plaintiffs deposed Peter on December 7, 2018 in Biliack v. The Paul 
Revere Life Ins. Co.224  Plaintiff submitted Peter’s deposition as an exhibit 
in Jacob v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am.225  Peter worked at Unum for thirty 
years.226  He explained Unum’s organization structure: 
 
• The claims department is called the Benefits Operation;227 
• Claims adjusters are called Disability Benefits Specialists 
(DBS);228 
• Disability benefits specialists report to Directors;229 
• Directors have an inventory of 250 – 300 active claims;230 
• Six Directors report to each Assistant Vice Presidents of 
Claims;231 
• Vice Presidents of Claims were responsible for 1,500 – 
1,800 active claims;232 
• Assistant Vice Presidents reported to the Vice President of 
Individual Disability.233 
 
There were 3-4 Assistance Vice Presidents of Claims in 2016.234  Although 
Peter did not identify the total number of active claims, the data provided 
suggests 4,500 – 7,200 active claims.  
 
221. Id. ¶ 11.  
222. Id. ¶ 17. 
223. Id. ¶ 18. 
224. No. 2:16-cv-03631-DJH (D. Ariz.).  
225. Deposition of Paul Peter, Jacob v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 1:19-cv-
00131-TRM-CHS, Dkt. 32-2 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 27, 2019).  
226. Id. 9. 
227. Id. 17. 
228. Id. 18. 
229. Id.  
230. Id. 14. 
231. Id. 12, 18. 
232. Id. 14. 
233. Id. 19. 
234. Id. 18. 
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Contrary to Wellman’s affidavit, Peter testified finances infiltrated 
the claims department: 
 
• Every open claim has a reserve dollar amount.235 
• Reserves were released when recovery was made.236  
• Recovery was made when Unum denied an initial claim or 
terminated a previously accepted claim.237  
• Unum has monthly recovery plans setting targets for 
recoveries.238  
• The targets include total number of claims and dollars to 
recover per month.239  
• Recovery plans had targets for each Director.240 
• Each Director’s planned recovery was $1-2 million per 
month.241 
• Each Assistant Vice President’s planned recovery was $6-
12 million monthly.242 
• Directors and Assistant Vice Presidents were accountable 
for meeting their recovery targets.243 
• Directors’ and Assistant Vice Presidents’ incentive 
compensation was based in part on the measure of actual 
recovery results.244 
• Communication of recovery plans was done orally.245 
• Assistant Vice Presidents and Directors wrote down their 
budgeted monthly recovery targets, but did not retain 
them.246 
• Peter did not know why Unum’s practice was to 
communicate recovery plans orally.247 
 
235. Id. 62. 
236. Id. 38. 
237. Id. 61.   
238. Id. 57. 
239. Id. 57-58. 
240. Id. 58. 
241. Id. If there were eighteen directors this resulted in target recoveries of $18-
36 million per month.   
242. Id. 58-59. 
243. Id. 84.  
244. Id. 127. 
245. Id. 128-29. 
246. Id. 131-32.  
247. Id. 133. 
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• Unum did not provide financial information to Disability 
Benefits Specialists.248 
 
Based on Paul’s testimony, if Wellman’s carefully worded affidavit 
is technically accurate, it is misleading.  Unum does not wall off finances 
from claims.  Financial pressure clearly influences claims decisions.  Unum 
is uncomfortable with the optics of its system since it destroys recovery 
target data.  
Withholding recovery targets from low level Disability Benefits 
Specialists does not absolve Unum from criticism.  Most organizations do 
not share robust financial information with non-executives.  Law firms are 
one example where non-partners rarely receive financial reports.  
Unum’s Disability Benefits Specialists may not know their 
Director’s recovery targets, but they must know targets exist.  Arguably, 
knowing Directors have targets for denials and/or terminations without 
knowing when targets are met would cause Disability Benefits Specialists 
to feel constant pressure to deny or terminate claims, whether or not needed 
to satisfy the monthly target.  
 
C. Losing lawsuits involving termination of benefits 
 
Another pattern in Unum cases is a proverbial forest hiding in the 
trees. Most decisions identifying Unum’s recurrent conduct discussed 
above involve terminations of benefits previously granted, not initial 
denials. Cases cited in this article involving terminations of benefits 
include: Chistoff v. Unum249, Kamerer v. Unum250, Clark v. Unum251, 
Dimopoulou v. First Unum252, Hart v. Unum253, Backman v. Unum254, 
Hertan v. Unum255, Bencivenga v. Unum256, Doe v. Unum257, Freeland v. 
Unum258, Hannon v. Unum259, Eichelmann v. Unum260, Houston v. 
 
248. Id. 118.  
249. 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167889. 
250. 334 F. Supp. 3d 411. 
251. 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175341. 
252. 162 F. Supp. 3d 250. 
253. 253 F. Supp. 3d 1053. 
254. 191 F. Supp. 3d 1053. 
255. 111 F. Supp. 3d 1075. 
256. 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39117. 
257. 35 F. Supp. 3d 182. 
258. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116931. 
259. 988 F. Supp. 2d 981. 
260. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92961. 
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Unum261, Glockson v. Unum262, Chronister v. Unum263, Mikrut v. Unum264, 
Evans v. Unum265, Moon v. Unum266, Utter v. Unum267, Crespo v. Unum268, 
Morgan v. Unum269 and Holzschuh v. Unum.270      
Paul Peter’s testimony suggests the reason for this pattern.  Unum 
imposes powerful financial incentives on directors to terminate claims.  
ERISA’s liability limitations protect Unum from punitive damages.  The 
result is a perverted system that turns fiduciary law on its head.  
 
V. EVALUATING UNUM’S POST-RSA CONDUCT 
 
A. Unum misled courts regarding its so-called improved claims handling 
 
Since Glenn and the RSA, some courts recognize Unum’s so-called 
improved claims-handling practices.271  These courts reason that because of 
the ‘improved’ claims-handling practices, Unum’s institutional bias noted 
in Glenn and other pre-RSA cases is stale and does not merit significant 
weight.272  Unum misled these courts. 
Unum’s claims-handling practices did not improve after the RSA.  
Contrary to its intent, the RSA provided Unum a playbook to continue its 
unscrupulous practices under a thin layer of respectability.  Courts and 
many claimants’ attorneys took the RSA at face value and assumed Unum 
corrected its institutional bias.  Unum did more than silently benefit from 
this misperception—it promoted it. Unum used the RSA’s existence to 
argue its biased claims administration was ancient history.  It was a ruse.  
Instead of a sword for claimants to keep Unum in check, the RSA became 
 
261. 246 F. App'x 293. 
262. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47613. 
263. 563 F.3d 773. 
264. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92265. 
265. 434 F.3d 866. 
266. 405 F.3d 373. 
267. 404 F. Supp. 2d 1204. 
268. 294 F. Supp. 2d 980. 
269. 346 F.3d 1173. 
270. 2002 WL 1609983. 
271. See, e.g., Truitt, 729 F.3d at 514 (citing Daniel v. UnumProvident Corp., 
No. CV-04-1073, 2010 WL 8292157, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2010); (Hagopian v. 
Johnson Fin. Grp., Inc. Long-Term Disability Plan, No. 09-C-926, 2010 WL 3808666, at 
*11-12 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 23, 2010)); Kamerer 251 F. Supp. 3d at 352 (citing Swanson v. 
Unum Life Ins. Co., No. 13-CV-4107-JAR, 2015 WL 339313, at *8 (D. Kan. Jan. 26, 
2015)); (Mercado v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 2013 WL 633100, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013); Burton v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 2010 WL 2430767, at *11 (W.D. Tex. 
2010)).  
272. Kamerer, 251 F. 3d at 352. 
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a shield protecting Unum from scrutiny even when the Supreme Court said 
it was warranted.    
 
B. Unum has an ongoing pattern of biased claims administration 
 
That Unum has lost many ERISA cases where it had a fiduciary 
duty to the claimant is not a pattern of biased claims administration.  That 
alone is just a list of cases Unum lost.  There is a pattern of biased claims 
administration because Unum repeatedly loses cases for the same 
underlying reasons.  Pervasive in Unum terminations are cherry-picking 
from the record, disregarding claimants’ favorable evidence, disregarding 
opinions of treating physicians and SSA disability determinations, 
mischaracterizing and not analyzing claimants’ job duties and related 
improper practices.  There are too many cases for these to be honest 
mistakes.  It is a playbook and Unum has no interest in correcting its biased 
conduct.  If it did, it would have done so years ago when repeated court 
losses exposed the pattern.    
 
C. Unum’s disability benefit terminations deserve heightened scrutiny 
 
Unum’s terminations should be viewed with heightened scrutiny 
compared to decisions denying initial claims.  Unlike initial claims, 
terminations are where Unum previously decided claimant could not 
perform their occupation.  Claimant’s continued inability to work is usually 
supported by their treating physicians and the SSA’s disability 
determination.  Claimant’s do not resubmit claims. Unum scours its files 
and selects claims for termination.  Unum’s justifications are manufactured 
to justify termination. The result is biased and flawed decision making.  
There is no discernible change in Unum’s claims administration 
after 2004.  There is little or no evidence Unum changed its practices.  
Courts finding Unum changed its practices assume that fact based on the 
RSA.  No court that made a comprehensive analysis of Unum’s documented 
practices found Unum’s biased conduct ended.  Now sixteen years since the 
RSA, it is clear Unum never changed.   
 
D. Unum profits from its unscrupulous practices 
 
When a court overturns Unum’s termination of a claimant’s 
disability benefits, the claimant is made whole only if the court awards 
attorney fees and claimant had financial resources to withstand not timely 
receiving benefits.  Conversely, Unum only pays the benefits owed, its 
attorney fees and occasionally, claimant’s attorney fees.  Math explains 
Unum’s motivation. 
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For example, assume four claims where Unum terminates benefits, 
recovering $200,000 per claim in reserves.  Next, assume Unum claimants 
sue Unum for the terminations and Unum spends $50,000 defending each 
claim.273  Unum must win only one in four lawsuits to break even: 
 
• Loss: -$50,000 (attorney fees; benefits reinstated) 
• Loss: -$50,000 (attorney fees; benefits reinstated) 
• Loss: -$50,000 (attorney fees; benefits reinstated) 
• Win: $150,000 (-$60,000 attorney fees; +$200,000 
benefits saved) 
 
Unum wins more than one in four lawsuits.  It may win more than 
half. Unum should win some lawsuits—not every termination is bogus.  But 
judging by weak plaintiff briefs in many cases, inadequate briefing is a 
factor in many Unum wins.  Unum pits experienced attorneys supervised 
by in-house counsel against plaintiff attorneys who are often novices in 
ERISA litigation.  An axiom in the ERISA defense bar is: “file your motion 
for summary judgment; send your bill; and victory!”  They would not find 
it funny if it did not ring true.  
Not every termination ends in a lawsuit.  An unknown percentage 
of claimants cannot find an attorney to take their case or do not even try.  
This percentage is greater than zero and known only to Unum. It does not 
take a mathematician to compute the percent of Unum’s profit in these 
claims: 100%.  
 
E. Unum usually also has more experienced attorneys 
 
Companies sued often develop a stable of experienced attorneys. 
This gives the defense attorneys two advantages: (1) expertise in the law; 
and (2) institutional knowledge of the defendant.  Consider the personal 
injury plaintiff attorney who files an automotive products liability case.  Not 
only will she face an auto liability specialist, but she could also be against 
an attorney who specializes in the defect at issue.  Similarly, in 
pharmaceutical litigation teams of lawyers focus on discrete fact or legal 
issues. It is a huge advantage for corporate defendants.  
Few plaintiff attorneys focus on ERISA litigation due to the uneven 
playing field. In an era of tort reform legislation and judges and juries 
influenced by tort reform campaigns, many formerly viable types of cases 
 
273. $60,000 is the estimated amount based on 200 hours of attorney time at an 
average billed rate of $300 per hour.  
236 MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [VOL. 39:2 
have been virtually eliminated.  Mandatory arbitration clauses killed most 
consumer litigation and closed the courthouse doors for many victims.  
ERISA cases are hard to win.  Most plaintiff attorneys would rather 
focus on practice areas like personal injury that have a preponderance of 
the evidence burden of proof.  This includes many of the most skilled 
plaintiff attorneys—the ones who stand the best chance of winning ERISA 
cases.  The few attorneys who make a living representing ERISA claimants 
are unique.  They are smart and talented.  They could earn more money 
handling different cases and know it.  They do not care.  They believe in 
what they are doing and their clients’ cause.  Without these attorneys Unum 
and other unscrupulous insurers would act with impunity.     
 
F. Congress should address ERISA’s inequities 
 
Congress could fix ERISA’s structural inequities if it had the 
inclination to do so.  All or a combination of the following would even the 
playing field: 
 
• De novo review for all claim decisions 
• Jury trials 
• Prohibit insurers from also serving as claims administrator 
• Authorize exemplary/ punitive damages for bad faith 
denials and terminations 
• Mandatory attorney fees for successful claimants 
• Grant courts authority to impose civil penalties. 
 
Given the current political climate and issues competing for Congress’s 




Since 2004 most courts deciding Unum cases appear to be unaware 
of the RSA or the post-RSA decisions revealing Unum’s continued pattern 
of biased claims administration.  Contrary to ERISA’s intent, Unum 
abrogates its fiduciary responsibility and administers claims as an 
adversary.  Unum did not improve its claims handling practices after the 
2004 RSA.  Unum’s criticized practices continued unabated to the present 
time.  
 
